Appeals: Confirmed Referee Decisions : #145 - May 25, 2004

D E C I S I O N

The Claimant submitted a request for compensation as a Secondarily-Infected Person under the Hemophiliac HCV Plan.

By letter dated December 8, 2003, the Administrator denied this claim, stating in his reply that the Secondarily-Infected Person must be the spouse or child of the Primarily-Infected Person. Alternatively, the Administrator also stressed that the claim must be submitted within three years of the first claim of the Primarily-Infected Person.

In this case, the Claimant argues that her son is a Primarily-Infected Person, and that she herself became secondarily infected after having provided him with health care over the years.

The Administrator does not argue the fact that the Claimant is HCV infected and it is known through the file that the Claimant's son, who suffers from serious Hemophilia type A, is also the HCV carrier.

The term 'Secondarily-Infected Person' is defined under article 1.01 of the Hemophiliac HCV Plan. This definition clearly states that a 'Secondarily-Infected Person' includes the spouse of a primarily infected hemophiliac or the child of an HCV infected person.

The Transfused HCV Plan and the Hemophiliac HCV Plan do not provide for compensation for all HCV infected persons. Rather, they are agreements within the context of very specific class actions, these settlements having been implemented to provide compensation for claims related to certain groups of HCV infected persons following blood transfusions.

In her Request for Review, the Claimant tells us that the definition of a 'Secondarily-Infected Person' is unfair and incomplete. Whether this definition is incomplete is unfortunately evident, but this definition is an integral part of the Plan accepted and ratified by the Courts and it is on the basis of this Plan that I must analyze the Claimant's Request for Review.

Clearly, the Claimant does not meet the definition of 'Secondarily-Infected Person' and even if I understand her deception and frustration, it is impossible for me to accept her arguments related to fairness. As a Referee, I have no discretionary power and I must comply with the Plan as written, as accepted by the Parties and as approved by the Courts.

I must therefore regrettably confirm the Administrator' s decision and reject the Request for Review.

MONTREAL, May 25, 2004

Jacques Nols

Referee